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SCANDINA  VIAN  REALIS,M
A  S  the  phrase  Scandinavian  realism  implies,  dIe  writers  whose
work  is generally considered under this head all have in common
a  rejection  of  explanations  of  a  legal  system or  of  legal  notions
which  either  are not  expressed in  factual  terms or, if  so expressed,
nevertheless make a concealed reference to non-factual  entities.  An
example  of  the  first  type  of  explanation  is  Kelsen's analysis of  a
legal system as a hierarchy  of ought  (not is) statements: an example
of  the second is Austin's  analysis of  law as the content  of  the will
of the state.  This  is aQ  apparently  factual definition  of law.  But in
so far  as law  cannot  be identified  with  dIe  intentions  of  the  indi-
vidual  legislators, then the will  of the state which is said to constitute
the law  cannot be located in  the world  of fact.
The  Scandinavian  writers  themselves attempt  to  provide  an
explanation  of  law  in  terms  of  fact  which  cannot  be criticised  on
the ground that the facts which it advances turn out on investigation
not  to  be facts at all.  Their  main  contribution  in  this  respect was
to include  under dIe label fact not just what can be seen or touched
or  heard  (the  phenomena  of  the  visible  or  external  world)  but
mental  states and  conditions  experienced by  people, in  particular
their  ideas, beliefs and feelings.  These mental and emotional  states
are given so prominent  a place in the accounts of the ScandinaviaJ:l
writers  that  their  approach to, and elucidation  of, legal notions can
aptly  be described as psychological.
In  the English  speaking world  the best known  of  the Scandina-
vian  realists  are  Axel  Hagerstrom,  Vilhelm  Lundstedt  and  Karl
Olivecrona  from  Sweden and Alf  Ross from  Denmark.  Their  work
shares dIe characteristics which  have already  been indicated.  It  is
anti-metaphysical  and it  seeks to  provide  an explanation  of  law  in
terms of  psychological  and other  facts.  Therefore  they can justly
be described as constituting  a school of thought.  Within  this frame-
work  there  are  considerable  differences between the  views  of  the
four  realists.  In  this paper I  shall attempt  to point  out some of the
differences especially as they are revealed in  the treatment  of  rules
of law and dIe notion  of rights and to make a,  brief assessment  of the
final positions which have been reached.
Hagerstrom,  the  founder  of  the  school,  stands in  quite  sharp
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contrast  to  Lundstedt,  Olivecrona  and  Ross.  He  produced  little
in the way of a constructive analysis of a legal system, concentrating
mainly  on  a series of  investigations  into  Roman  law  and  on very
detailed  refutations  of  theories which  conceived law  as the will  or
the  command  of  the  state.  His  Roman  law  studies  yielded  the
conclusion  that  the Romans believed their  legal system to be com-
posed  of  magical  powers  Which  could  be  utilised  and  made  to
produce  results  in  the  world  of  fact  if  the  appropriate  acts were
performed.  Thus  by  the  performance  of  a formal  act  known  as
mancipatio  one person could  transfer  property  to  another  in  such
a way  that  the latter  obtained  over it  a magical power  which  con-
stituted him  owner.  The primitive  Roman belief in magical powers
survived  into  the modern  age, though in a disguised form.  Hager-
strom  maintained  that  any  attempt  to  find  facts  with  which  the
rights  and duties of a modern legal system could be identified  must
end in failure.  On the other hand people did  talk  about rights and
duties  as though  they  were real  entities  possessed  of  an objective
existence.  The  only  conclusion  possible was that  they  meant  by
rights  and duties, mysterious, supernatural  powers and bonds.
In  the course of  his refutation  of  the will  theories Hagerstrom
worked  out a version of rights  and duties difficult  to reconcile with
that  which  he obtained from  his Roman  studies.  He held that  the
pressures to which an individual  was subjected through  his member-
ship of  a society generated in  him  certain feelings of  power and of
restriction.  The  individual  gave  spontaneous expression  to  his
feelings of  power  by saying that he had a right,  and to his feelings
of  restriction  by  saying that  he was under  a duty.  Statements in
the indicative  form  about rights and duties induced him  to conceive
of being a right  and being a duty as qualities or properties possessed
by  certain  actions,  even though  no  such properties  existed in  the
natural  world.l
By  two  different  routes  Hagerstrom  arrived  at  the  conclusion
that  people believed rights  and duties  (and other  legal notions)  to
have  an  objective,  real  existence, even though  the  belief  was an
illusion.  He  indicates  briefly  the  importance  of  this  belief  and
people's  feelings  of  power  and  duty  as  factors  in  securing  the
For  H3.gerstrom's  views see the  collection of  his essays  translated into  English by
Professor  Broad under the title Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals, especially
chapters I  and VI.  For  discussions  of  Hagerstrom see Broad, 1951, 26 Philosophy
99;  Passmore,  1961, 36 Philosophy 143; Olivecrona, 1959, 3 Scandinavian  Studies  in
Law  125  :  Essays  in  Jurisprudence  in  honor of  Roscoe Pound (ed. R.  A.  Newman),
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maintenance of  a  legal  system (viewed  as organised processes of
coercion within  a society to enforce what are regarded as duties and
protect  what  are regarded as rights).2  But  he does not  work  out
from  realist  premises a comprehensive analysis of  a legal  system;
nor  does he  study  in  detail  the  function  which  statements about
rights  and  duties  have.  Botll  tasks have been undertaken  by  his
followers  who  have made his  conclusions  the  foundation  of  their
own  more  constructive  analyses.3  The  three  later  writers  are all
rigorously  anti-metaphysical  and adopt  the criticisms  which  Hager-
strom  had  developed  of  the  will  theories.  They  all  base their
accounts of  a legal system on the feelings experienced by members
of  a society and tlley  all  retain  vestiges of  Hagerstrom's  treatment
of  a  legal  system as a system of  magical  or  supernatural  powers
and  bonds.
It  is  not  necessary to  say much  concerning  Lundstedt  whose
contribution  has been the  least significant  of  the  three.~  He criti-
cised  traditional  legal  ideology  for  confusing  cause  and  effect.
Lawyers  habitually  represent a sanction as attached to a breach of
duty  on the part  of the individual,  or the enjoyment of some advan-
tage as attached to the possession  of a right.  In reality  the position
is the reverse.  It  is  the consistent punishment  of  certain  types of
behaviour  by the courts that gives rise to feelings of duty  in respect
of  the behaviour  punished.  These feelings are expressed in  state-
ments  about  duties,  statements which  are  meaningless except  as
expressions of  feelings.  Likewise  the consistent according  of  pro-
tection  to  people who  behave in  certain ways gives rise to feelings
of  power  which  are  expressed in  meaningless statements about
rights.5
Any  legal  situation  can  be explained  in  terms  of  how  people
actually  behave and the  beliefs which  they hold.  Ownership  may
be explained by looking  at the behaviour of the owner in a particular
case, the behaviour  of the courts, and the beliefs which people hold
in  connection with  the owner.  First  one can say that  an owner is
a person who has acquired the object which he owns in a particular
way,  by  sale, gift,  inheritance  and  so on.  Then  one can describe
his  behaviour  in  relation  to  the  object,  and note  that  whereas he
2 mgerstrom,  Inquiries,  348 et seq.
3 Strictly  only  Lundstedt  and  Olivecrona  are  disciples  of  Hiigerstrom;  but  his  influence
has also been very strong  on the work  of  Ross.
4 See Lundstedt,  "  Law  and  Justice,"  in  lnterpretalions  of  Modern  Legal  Philosophies
(ed. Sayre);  Legal  Thinking  Revised,  especially  Part  I.
5 Lundstedt,  Legal  Thinking  Revised,  123 et seq.36 SCANDINA  VIAN  REALISM
may treat  the object in any way he pleases,  if  another person inter-
feres against  the  owner's  wishes then  the  courts  will  step in  and
compel  the third  person to  abstain from  interference.  This  is one
side of  the  account,  the  description  of  people's actual  behaviour .
The other side is an account of the beliefs which make the behaviour
intelligible.  Both  the owner himself  and the other members of the
society believe that  he is able to  behave as he likes  in  relation  to
the  object  w'hich  he  owns  because he  has  a  right  and  because
everyone else is  under  a  duty  to  abstain  from  interference.  The
belief  in  the owner's  right  and everyone else's duty  brings about  a
psychological attitude  in members of the society which induces them
to let the owner behave as he wishes in connection with  the object
owned.  Judges in consequence of their  belief that  the owner has a
right feel bound to protect the owner in his enjoyment of the object.'
For  Lundstedt,  then,  the  belief  in  the  existence of  rights  and
duties is important  because of  the psychological  influence which  it
has upon  people's behaviour,  but  sentences  about rights  and duties
and these words themselves are meaningless except in so far as they
can  be  treated  as expressions of  feelings.1  Olivecrona  and  Ross
while  still  emphasising the importance  of beliefs and feelings in the
analysis of  a  legal  system hold  that  statements about  rights  and
duties are more than just expressions of feelings.  Even though the
words right  and  duty  do not  designate identifiable  objects the sen-
tences in  which  these  words  occur  have  certain  functions.  A
description  of  those functions  can provide  an adequate account of
the meaning of rights and duties.
The key to the understanding of a legal notion  lies in the recog-
nition  of  the fact  that  language may be used to  achieve ends other
than a mere description  or report  of a state of affairs.  Both  Olive.
crona and  Ross in  their  most recent works  stress the multiple  uses
of  language.
Olivecrona  distinguishes between language which  describes facts
and language which  performs some other function,  such as to induce
people to  behave in  particular  ways or  to  express or  arouse emo-
tions.8  Legal  language belongs to  the  latter  category .It  is used
in  order  to  get people to  behave in  certain  ways; it  is directive  as
6 Ibid., 93 et seq.
1 Lundstedt suggests  that ..the  expressions  legal rights, duties obligations, relationships,
claims and demands, properly  speaking, should not  be used, not  even as terms or
labels," though he admits that it is impossible  to do without them, ibid., 17.
8 Olivecrona, ..Legal  Language and Reality,"  in  Essays  in  Jurisprudence  in  honor  of
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distinct  from  reporting  language.  Within  the  field  of  directive
language there is a furtlIer  important  classification to be made.  Some
words  can be classified as words  which  possess  purely  a technical
function  (hollow  words  in  Olivecrona's  tenninology)  and  some
utterances can be classified as performatives.
A  word,  a noun,  may not  stand for  any object,  and yet its  use
may  be found  indispensable in  many  contexts.  Although  it  does
not  describe anything  it  can, and often has to,  be used in  order  to
accomplish certain transactions or to produce desired results.  Olive..
crona gives as an example of  such a word  the units  of  a monetary
system (the pound or the dollar)  and remarks :
" The case  of the monetary unit is highly  illuminating.  We find
here a noun  ostensibly used as denoting  an object.  But  tlIere
is no object; the word  has ceased  to denote anything  at all.  It
nevertheless plays an important  role when employed in certain
ways according to law and social custom.  By means of its use
the whole  exchange of  goods and services is mediated.9"
An  utterance is perfonnative  when it  is used not  to  describe a
state of  affairs  but  to  bring  something about  and  in  particular  to
effect  a  change in  legal  relationships.l°  Olivecrona  adopts  J.  L.
Austin's  analysis  of  perfonnative  utterances  and  cites  from  him
the  example  " I  do "  taken  from  the  marriage  ceremony  .11  The
words  " I  do "  uttered in the course of the ceremony have the effect
of  creating  the  legal  relationship  of  marriage  between the  parties.
The  effect of  perfonnatives  is explained by Olivecrona  as a relic of
the time  when words were believed to have magical properties and
the  utterance  of  certain  words  was believed magically  to  have the
power  to  actualise what  the  words  described.  Olivecrona  admits
that  perfonnatives  cannot  nowadays  be  explained  as  pieces
of  magic.  Even  if  the  belief  in  the  magical  function  of  legal
language survives it  has only minor  significance.12 The function  of
a  perfonnative  can  be  understood  if  one  takes  into  account  the
psychological  influence  which  it  has.  The  words  " I  do "  uttered
in  the  course  of  the  marriage  ceremony  operate  by  influencing
people to  treat  the husband and wife  in a way quite  different  from
the  way  in  which  they  have  been treated  prior  to  the  marriage.
9 Ibid.  173.
10 Ibid.  174 et  seq.
11 See I.  L.  Austin,  ..Performative  Utterances,"  in  Philosophical  Papers,  and  How  to
Do  Things  with  Wor-ds, Lecture  1.
12 Olivecrona,  "  Legal  Language  and Reality,"  op.  dt.,  190 et seq.38 SCAND1NA  VIAN  REALISM
Whether  one tlrinks  of  the  social or  the legal effects of  marriage,
the  reality  of  the  situation  is  constituted  by  the  reactions  called
forth  by  the  completion  of  the  ceremony  .13
Ross makes a distinction  between indicative and directive speech.
Indicative  speech " expresses the  idea  of  or  describes a topic  1. ";
it  is  that  which  is  used to  report  a state of  affairs  and to  convey
information.  Directive  speech " expresses a  directive,  that  is,  an
action-idea  conceived as a pattern  of  behaviour 15  ";  it  is the form
of  speech used when one person wants to get another person to do
something, to  behave in  a particular  way.
Directives  may  be in  the imperative  mood;  or  they  may  make
use of words which themselves  have a directive force (ought, bound,
right,  duty  and so on).  In  such cases they  carry  a visible  sign of
their  function.  But  directives may be phrased in the indicative  and
may  look  as though  they  are merely  descriptions  of  fact.  Never-
theless their  function  is to get people to behave in a particular  way.
Legal  language especially makes use of  directives  which  look  like
indicatives.16  An  example  which  Ross gives is a statement found
in  the  Danish  criminal  code:  " whoever  kills  another  man is  im-
prisoned  for  five  years to  life."  11  Directives  are normally  issued
in circumstances where it  is probable  that they will  be effective and
that  the person to whom  they are addressed will  behave in the way
indicated.  The  likelihood  of  compliance  may  depend upon  some
external factor,  such as whether a sanction has been attached to the
directive  or whether the person issuing it is regarded as an authority
by the person to whom it is addressed.18
Finally  there  are  utterances  which  are  neither  indicative  nor
directive  but  purely  emotive  such as exclamations  of  pleasure or
pain.  Indicative  or  directive  1,ltterances,  especially the latter,  may
have an emotive  aspect.  A  directive  which  makes use of  an emo-
tionally  charged  word,  for  example  right  or  duty,  is  a  powerful
instrument  of persuasion.19
The multiple  function  of language and the psychological realities
of  beliefs  and  feelings  are  the  main  elements in  the  explanation
offered by  Olivecrona  and Ross of legal rules and their validity  and
of legal rights.  Both consider legal rules to be expressed  in language
which  is designed to get people to behave in certain ways.  In  order
13 lbid.  179.
15 lbid.  34.
17 lbid.  37.
19 lbid.  74 et seq.
14  Ross,  Directives  and  Norms,  9.
18  Ibid.  36  et  seq.
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some recognition  of  this point  by  Olivecrona.24  But  the danger of
the  directive  (quasi-command) and  the  imperative  terminology  is
that  a necessary distinction  between the  content  of  a rule  and its
force  is  obscured.
To describe a rule of law as a quasi-command or an independent
imperative  is  not  enough  to  make  it  intelligible.  Two  further
questions arise : how is a rule of law to be distinguished from  other
quasi-commands or independent imperatives, and how is the notion
of the validity  of a rule  of law to be explained?  The first  question
is answered by Olivecrona and Ross in the same way.  Rules of law
are  those  independent  imperatives  or  quasi-commands  within  a
society which are concerned with  the regulation  of the use of force.
In  particular  they  establish  the  conditions  under  which,  and  the
agencies by  whom,  sanctions can be inflicted  on those who  fail  to
behave in the prescribed manner .25 Undoubtedly  many rules of law
are concerned with  the use of force and it  is difficult  to conceive of
a viable  legal system which  does not  function  with  some degree of
efficacy (through the regular application  of sanctions).  But to imply
that  a rule is not  a rule of law unless it  provides for  the application
of  a sanction leads to  the same distorted  picture  of  a legal system
as the  suggestion that  all  rules  of  law  are  rules  which  regulate
behaviour.
The explanation  offered by Olivecrona  and Ross of the sense  in
which  the validity  of  a rule  is to  be understood is central  to  their
whole view of law.  Both  explain  validity  in terms of psychological
facts (feelings and beliefs), but the details of their explanations differ
quite  substantially.  For  Olivecrona  a rule  of  law  essentially is an
independent  imperative  which  is generally  obeyed within  the com-
munity.  The  question, in  what  does the validity  of  a rule  consist,
can be answered by an account of why the imperative  is obeyed, or ,
as he puts it,  by  an elucidation  of  the " social significance "  of  an
independent  imperative. 26  Basically  there  are  two  reasons for
obedience to  those independent imperatives which  are rules of law.
The first  is the existence of coercive machinery within  the state and
the second is the psychological  reaction of members of  the society.
Society  is  organised in  such a way  that  the content  of  certain
24 Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 42;  ., Legal Language  and Reality,"  op. cit.  180 where the
promulgation of a law is classified  as a performative utterance.  I  have not been able
to  see Olivecrona's essay, ..The  Imperative Element in  the Law,"  1964, 18 Rutgers
Law Review 794 et seq.
25 Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 134  et seq.  ; Ross, On Law and Justice, 32 et seq.  ; Directives
and Norms, 93.  26 Olivecrona,  Law a$ Fact, SO.41 SCANDINA  VIAN  REALISM
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obedience paid to the commands of the sovereign.  The difference is
that  Olivecrona  looks  at  the matter  from  the point  of  view  of  the
psychology of  the individual,  not just from  the point  of view of his
external  behaviour .28
In  addition  to  releasing  an  urge  of  compliance  independent
imperatives may arouse a more positive  state of  mind  in  the mem-
bers of the society.  If  they require people to behave in a particular
way  they  may  arouse feelings of  duty  in  respect of  the behaviour
prescribed.  If  they  confer  advantages they may arouse feelings of
power.  The  use of  the words duty  and right  in the formulation  of
the  independent  imperatives  is  particularly  apt  to  arouse feelings
of duty  and feelings of power.  Such feelings when aroused provide
an  extra  stimulus  to  observance of  the  independent  imperatives
which  arouse them.29
Finally  there is the belief  people have that independent impera-
tives produced in a certain way possess  an objective validity.  They
believe  that  these independent  imperatives  possess in  an  absolute
sense the quality  or  property  " that  they are to  be obeyed."  This
belief  is an illusion.  No  such property  or quality  exists in the real
world.  " The'  binding  force'  of  the  law,"  Olivecrona  remarks,
" is a reality  merely as an idea in  human minds.  There is nothing
in the outside world  which corresponds to this idea." 30 Nevertheless
the belief  in  the validity  or  the binding  force  of  rules of  law is an
important  fact because  it is one of the pressures which ensures  com-
pliance with imperatives recognised as rules of law.  Olivecrona does
suggest that  existence of  the  belief  is not  necessary for  the main-
tenance of  a legal system and that  being a belief  in  something that
has no  reality  it  should  be discredited  and expelled from  people's
minds.31  ,
Olivecrona's  position  may be summed up as follows.  A  realist
explanation  of  a rule  of  law  can be given by  identifying  the inde-
pendent imperatives  which  are regularly  and generally enforced by
the coercive processes within  a society, by  describing  the  manner
in which these imperatives are created, and by describing the psycho-
logical  reactions of  the members of  the society to  them.
Ross' account of rules of law has been presented in two principal
versions, one in  On  Law  and  Justice, the  other  in  Directives  and
28 Ibid.  51 et seq., and  especially  Olivecrona's  later  work,  Der  Imperativ  del  Gesetzes.
29 Olivecrona,  Law  a.Y  Fact,  14, 98.
30 Ibid.  17.
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Norms.  There  are important  differences between these versions.
In  On  Law  and Justice Ross presents an analysis of  a rule  of  law
whicll  is reminiscent of that made by H. L.  A.  Hart  in The Concept
of  Law,  though  there are crucial  differences.32 A  rule  is a direc-
tive in the sense  that it is intended to exert an influence on people's
behaviour.  More  correctly  the  only  people  whose  behaviour
is  of  relevance when  considering  a  rule  of  law  are  judges  and
other  members  of  the  law-enforcing  agencies.  All  rules  of  law
are to  be construed  as directives  to  the  judges even though  they
regulate  the  conduct  of  members  of  the  society  in  general.  In
order  to  understand  the  sense in  which  directives  to  judges  are
rules one has to distinguish between their external and their internal
aspect.33 The external  aspect consists in the outward  behaviour  of
the judges.  A  person observing the behaviour of the judges would
observe that  they regularly  applied  to  cases  before them  directives
which  exhibited  certain  signs, that  is,  signs that  they  had  been
enacted in  accordance with  the constitutional  procedures.
More  important  is the internal aspect since this alone can explain
why the judges behave as they do.  The internal  aspect of the rule
consists in  the fact  that  it  is experienced or felt  by the judges to be
binding.  The  nature  of  the  feeling  experienced by  the  judges is
described as a " pure feeling of duty ." 34  It  is not a feeling derived
from  the judges' fear  of  sanctions or  their  desire to  promote  their
own interests.  The  validity  of  a rule  means first  that  judges base
their  behaviour  (in  their  capacity  as  judges)  upon  the  rule  by
carrying  out  the instructions  it  contains as to the apportionment  of
penalties and  the  determination  of  rights  and  duties,  and  second
that  they  base their  behaviour  upon  the  rule  because they  feel  it
to  be  binding  on  them.  Rules  of  law  thus  not  only  serve as a
means by  which  the  past and present behaviour  of  judges can be
explained but  as a means by  which  their  future  behaviour  can be
predicted.35
A  consequence of  Ross' view is that  a directive  is only  a valid
rule  of  law  if  it  is effectively  applied  by  the  courts.  He  is faced
with  the same problem  as Olivecrona.  A  law which  is still  on the
statute  book  but  is  not  enforced  by  the  courts  cannot  on  his
premises be a valid  rule of law.36  The principal  difference between
32 cf.  Hart's  review  of  On  Law  and Justice,  1959 C.L.J.  233.
33 Cf.  Ross, Directives  and Norms,  37, n.  I.
34 Ibid.  53.
36 Ross,  On  Law  and  Justice,  II  et seq., 29 et  seq.  Cf.  Arnholm,  1957, I  Scandinavian
Studies in  Law,  II.  36 Ross,  On  Law  and  Justice,  35.44 SCAND1NA  VIAN  REALISM
the analysis of  Ross and the analysis of  Olivecrona  is that  for  the
latter  the internal  aspect of a rule consists in the psychological reac-
tion  of  the majority  of  the  members of  the  society.  No  position
of  pre-eminence is assigned to the judges.  This is certainly  a point
in  Olivecrona's  favour.  It  is  a  gross  distortion  of  the  truth  to
construe every rule  of law as a directive  to the courts.37
In  an earlier  work.  Towards  a Realistic  Jurisprudence.  Ross.
like  Olivecrona,  had examined the supposed objective and absolute
nature  of  validity  and found  that  the belief  in  its  objectivity  arose
from  a  rationalisation  of  impulses  and  feelings  experienced  by
members of  a community  in  relation  to  directives enforced by  the
courts.38  In  On Law and Justice he describes the objectified  notion
of  validity  which  is produced  from  a rationalisation  of  feelings as
a moral.  higher  validity  related  to  God  or  reason.39  He  appears
to  be referring  here to  views which  declare a law  to  be invalid  if
it conflicts with certain moral notions.
Ross' latest work.  Directives  and Norms,  contains an important
modification  of  the  analysis of  a legal rule  made in  On  Law  and
Justice.  It  contains also a more precise interpretation  of the words
valid  and  invalid.  In  accordance with  his  earlier  analysis  Ross
argues that  a norm  (a rule  of  law) can be " defined neither  merely
as a linguistic  phenomenon  (the meaning content  which  is a direc-
tive)  nor  merely  as a  social  fact."  '0  It  is  to  be  defined  as  " a
directive  which  corresponds in  a  particular  way  to  certain  social
facts."  41  The  social  facts become intelligible  only  in  the  light  of
the  directive  and  the  directive  itself  is intelligible  only  as applied
to  the  facts.
The change which  Ross introduces concerns the range of  appli-
cation  of  legal directives.  He no longer  defines them in  terms of
the behaviour  and the feelings of  judges and  other  officials  but  in
terms of  the behaviour  and the feelings of  all  the members of  the
society.  or  at  least  such classes of  it  as are  within  the  scope of
the directive.  The following  argument is presented :  (I)  the funda-
mental  condition  for  the existence of  a norm  must  be that  in  the
37 Ross  criticises  Olivecrona's  view,  which  he labels  psychological  realism,  on  the  ground
that  it  makes  the  legal  consciousness  relevant  to  the  internal  aspect  of  a  rule  depend
upon  the  psychology  of  the  individual,  ibid.  72.  Olivecrona's  description  of  the  auto-
matic  response  generated  in  members  of  the  society  to  obey  what  are  presented  to
them  as rules  of  law  is  treated  as relevant  to  the  question:  Why  is  law  obeyed ? not
to the question,  In  what  does the validity  of  the law  consist?  Ibid.  54.
38 Ross, Towards  a Realistic  Jurisprudence,  12.
39 Ross, On Law  and  Justice,  53, 364 et seq.
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majority  of cases  the pattern of behaviour presented in the directive
is  followed  by  the  members  of  the  society,  (2)  if  a  rule  is  not
effective in  this  sense it  would  be misleading to  say that  it  exists,
(3) the  requirement  that  the  pattern  of  behaviour  prescribed  by
the norm  is followed  means that  those to whom  the norm  applies
in  fact  observe its  provisions,  thus  if  a  norm  establishes closing
hours for  shops it  is only  shopkeepers who will  behave in  the way
prescribed, (4) external observation of  the behaviour  prescribed by
the  norm  is  not  enough  to  warrant  the  conclusion  that  a  norm
exists.
" For  it  is necessary for  the establishment of  a nonn  that
it  be followed  not  only  with  external  regularity,  that  is  with
observable confonnity  to the rule, but  also with  the conscious-
ness of following  a rule and being bound to do so." '2
The  question  of  the  internal  aspect  of  a  rule  is  elaborated
further.  Ross rightly  rejects the  view  that  it  consists in  the  fact
that failure to observe the prescribed behaviour is regularly pUnished
by  the  infliction  of  a  sanction  and  that  the  expectation  of  such
punishment arouses  in the individual  concerned a feeling of coercion
(a  feeling  that  he  must  behave  as  prescribed  if  he  is  to  avoid
pUnishment).  The  correct  view  locates the  internal  aspect in  the
feeling of obligation  aroused by the rule in respect of the behaviour
it  prescribes.  This  feeling is not a feeling of fear of  consequences;
nor is it  a feeling that  one's own interests are being protected.  It
is simply  a feeling  of  compulsion  to  observe the  behaviour  pre-
scribed.  Ross  describes  this  feeling  of  compulsion  as  " the
experience of  validity ." '3
The conclusion which Ross finally  advances  is that while all rules
of  law can logically  be reduced to  directives to  the courts, psycho-
logically  there  is  a  distinction  between  primary  nonns  addressed
to  citizens  and  secondary nonns  addressed to  courts."  This  is
undoubtedly  an improvement  upon  the  view  that  all  rules  of  law
are  directives  to  the  courts,  but  there  remains  a  difficulty.  It
seems that  in  order  to  decide whether  a rule  exists one examines
regularities of  behaviour  and determines Whether they are brought
«  lbid.  83.
'3  lbid.  84 et seq.
4'  lbid.  90.  Ross  writes :  ..Rules  addressed  to  citizens  are  felt  psychologically  to  be
independent  entities  which  are  grounds  for  the  reactions  of  the  authorities.  If  we
apply  our  definition  of  the  existence  of  a norm,  primary  rules  must  be  recognised  as
actually  existing  norms,  in  so far  as they  are  followed  with  regularity  and  experienced
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about  by  certain  feelings  of  compulsion.  One may  observe that
all  shopkeepers regularly  close their  shops at a certain  time  in  the
evening and upon inquiry  one may discover that they all experience
a  feeling  of  compulsion  to  close their  shops at  this  time.  One
may  then  deduce that  there  is  a legal  rule  requiring  shops to  be
closed at this time.  But the rest of the community  does not behave
in  this  way  and  certainly  does not  experience feelings of  compul-
sion in  respect of  the  closing  of  shops at  a certain  time.  Can it
therefore  be  said  that  from  their  point  of  view  there  is  a  rule ?
The problem  is:  how is a rule which obtains purely within  a limited
class of  persons to  be distinguished  from  a rule  which  is valid  for
the whole  community  even though  it  regulates the behaviour  of  a
limited  class?  A  possible  solution  open  to  Ross  is  that  a  rule
which  is  valid  for  the  whole  community  is  one that  is  enforced
by the courts.  However  this forces him  back to his original,  inde-
fensible  position  in  which  a  rule  of  law  is  defined  as a directive
regularly  acted upon  by  judges and felt  by  them to  be binding.
Ross  clarifies  his  understanding  of  the  notion  of  validity  by
distinguishing  its meaning in moral  philosophy  from  its meaning in
legal language.  In moral  philosophy  validity  denotes "  a supposed
non-empirical  quality  which belongs to certain norms."  4.5 No such
quality  in  fact  exists;  it  is  a  rationalisation  of  " experiences of
validity ."  From  this  it  can  be  inferred  that  on  Ross'  view  the
members  of  the  society  who  experience  a  directive  as  binding
rationalise  their  feelings of  compulsion  and attribute  to  the direc-
tive  an objectively  conceived quality  of  validity.  The  description
of  validity  as a moral  notion  suggests that  it  functions  as a moral
ground  or  justification  for  obedience to the law.  In  speech which
expresses legal  rules  the  words  valid  and  invalid  are  used as a
means of  stating whether a legal act  (acte juridique)  has its  appro-
priate  legal effects or not.  To  say that  a will  is valid  is to say that
it  brings  about  the  legal  effects  determined  by  the  rules  which
govern  the  making  of  wills.  To  say that  a contract  is  invalid  is
to say that  it  does not bring  about  the legal effects which  the rules
relating to contracts provide.4.6
Some incidental  difficulties  which arise from  the analysis of legal
rules and validity  offered by Olivecrona and Ross have already been
pointed out.  The fundamental question is, can the notion of validity
be  adequately  explained  in  terms  of  feelings  or  psychological
48  Ibtd.  ,104  et  seq. 4.  lbid.  104.47 SCANDINA  VIAN  REALISM
reactions.  Does a valid  rule  of  law  mean a directive  which  is felt
to  be binding  by  members of  the society or  which  arouses an im-
pulse  of  obedience..7  The  answer  to  both  questions  must  be
negative.  In  the first  place there is an obvious distinction  between
a feeling  that  one is bound  by a rule  and the statement that  a rule
is binding.  If  one says that  a rule  is binding  one does not  mean
that  one feels bound  by  it  even if  in  fact  a feeling  of  being bound
is  experienced..s  The  reply  made by  Olivecrona  to  this  point  is
that  the statement that  a rule is binding  is a reference to  the belief
that  the behaviour  prescribed  by  the  rule  possesses  a non-existent
quality,  that  of  being  binding.  Ross'  reply  is  that  the  statement
may  assert 49  that  the  rule  possesses  a moral  quality;  it  conforms
with  what  is  required  by  God  or  reason.  Both  might  add  that
the  statement  also has certain  functions.  It  allows  inferences to
be  made  as to  the  origin  of  the  directive  and  the  consequences
which  will  follow  if  the prescribed behaviour  is not  observed.  It
might  also have an effect on  people's behaviour .50
It  might  be the  case that  the  statement that  a rule  is binding
does have certain  functions.  But  an enumeration  of  the functions
does not  exhaust the meaning of  the  statement; nor  does it  catch
its  essence.  A  statement  that  a  rule  is  binding  implies  that  the
rule  belongs  to  a  system  of  rules  and  that  there  exist  certain
criteria  by  which  the  rules belonging  to  the system can be identi-
fied.  It  states that  the  rule  in  question  is  a  rule  of  the  system
because it  complies  with  the  criteria  by  which  such  rules  are
identified.  A  statement that a rule is valid  is not a statement about
a belief  in  the  existence of  non-factual  properties  of  actions;  nor
is  it  an  assertion  that  the  rule  possesses  a  moral  (non-factual)
quality.
To  hold  that  validity  cannot  be  explained  by  a  reference to
feelings is not  to  deny the importance  of  feelings or  other  psycho-
logical  reactions  for  the  maintenance  of  a  legal  system.  It  may
even be the case that a certain  psychological  attitude  towards rules
of  law  on  the  part  of  the  members of  the  society and  especially
on  the  part  of  those concerned with  the  enforcement  of  the  law
47 There  is  a  certain  difference  in  the  treatment  of  Olivecrona  and  Ross.  The  latter
speaks of  a  feeling  that  the  directive  is  binding;  the  former  speaks of  the  impulse  to
obey  and  here  a feeling  of  being  bound  is only  one  of  the  states of  mind  which  may
be  relevant.  48 Cf.  Hart,  The  Concept  of  Law,  56.
49 Ross  also  holds  that  a  statute  like  other  actes juridiques  is  invalid  if  it  has  not  been
enacted  in  accordance  with  the  procedures  established  by  a  00  norm  of  competence,"
Directives  and  Norms,  96,  131.
.0  Cf..  infra.  the analysis  of  statements about  rights  in  terms of  their  functions.48 SCANDINA VIAN  REALISM
is  a necessary condition  for  the  existence of  a  legal  system.  To
make the validity  of  an individual  rule  of  the system depend upon
feelings  aroused in  the  minds  of  members of  the society not  only
involves  the  obvious  difficulty,  how  is the presence of  the feelings
to be determined, but  leads to consequences  unacceptable from  the
realist  point  of  view.  In  order  to  avoid  the  objection  that  mem-
bers of  the  society, even judges,  so far  from  experiencing  actual
feelings  of  being  bound  in  respect  of  a  particular  rule  may
experience  positive  feelings  of  revulsion  or  no  feelings  at  all,
Olivecrona  and  Ross  have  to  assume that  the  production  of  a
feeling  of  being  bound  (or  other  psychological  urge  to  obey) is  a
necessary  accompaniment  of a directive  which  is a rule of law.  On
this  assumption feelings are attributed  to  persons who  may not  in
fact  experience them and the same criticism  can be made as Olive-
crona  and  Ross make  of  Austin's  conception  of  the  will  of  the
state, namely,  that  the alleged feelings have no place in  the world
of  fact.
Ross'  discussion of  tlIe  internal  aspect of  a rule  may  be com-
pared with  that  made by H.  L.  A.  Hart  in  The Concept of  Law.51
Ross defines the  internal  aspect of  a rule  as the  consciousness of
being bound and by this he means a feeling that the rule is binding.
Hart  distinguishes between the external  and the internal  aspects of
a rule  but  he does not  identify  the internal  aspect with  a state of
consciousness that  could  be described as a feeling  of  being bound.
It  consists rather  in  an  acceptance that  the  behaviour  prescribed
by the rule  constitutes a standard to be followed  and that deviation
from  the behaviour is a good ground for criticism.  Hart writes :
" What  is necessary is that  there should be a critical  reflective
attitude  to  certain  patterns  of  behaviour  as  a  common
standard,  and  that  this  should  display  itself  in  criticism
(including  self-criticism),  demands for  conformity,  and in  ack-
nowledgments  that  such criticism  and  demands are  justified,
all of which find their characteristic expression in the normative
terminology  of'  ought,'  , must,'  and'  should,'  , right'  and
, wrong.'  " 52
51 Hart,  The Concept  of  Law,  54 et seq.
52 lbid.  56.  Ross,  Directives  and  Norms,  63,  n.  3  notes  that  Hart's  requirement  of
acceptance differs  from  his own  requirement  of  a feeling  of  being  bound.~
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aspect of  acceptance has to  be distinguished  from  the  validity  of
a rule.  Where a rule  does not  belong to a system of rules, then it
is appropriate  to speak of its acceptance by members of the society.
Where the rule belongs to a system, what is relevant is not whether
it  is  accepted but  whether  it  complies with  the  criteria  by  which
rules of  the system are identified.  If  it  complies with  the criteria
(the  rule  of  recognition),  then  it  is  a  rule  whether  or  not  it  is
accepted.  The words " valid "  and " invalid  "  can properly  be used
only  of  rules which  belong to  a system.  They  designate the com-
pliance  or  non-compliance  of  the  rule  with  the  criteria  specified
in the rule of recognition.53  Ross' position  is ambivalent.  On the
one hand he classifies the act of legislation  as an acte juridique  and
hence holds  that  a statute  is invalid  if  it  has no  effect because it
does not comply  with  the conditions  established for  the creation  of
new rules of  law .54  On  the  other  hand he discusses rules  of  law
Which belong to a system in terms of the " experiences of validity  "
which  they  arouse.  In  this  context  he  states that  " , validity'  is
nothing  but  the peculiar  characteristic  of  these experiences." 55  It
is the secolid interpretation  of  validity  which  seems incorrect.  An
" experience of  validity  "  may  be  relevant  if  one  has  to  decide
whether ani alleged rule, not  belonging to a system, is a rule.  If  a
rule is alleged to belong to a system, then what is relevant in deter-
mining  its  status is not  the  experiences of  members of  the society
but  its  compliance  with  the  criteria  by  which  rules  of  the  system
are identified.5G
The same mixture  of linguistic  function  and psychology used to
explain  a rule  of  law  is used by  Olivecrona  and  Ross to  explain
the notion  of  a legal right.  In  Law  ay F act Olivecrona  shows at
some length  that  there is  no  factual  situation  which  of  itself  can
explain the notion  of  right.  In  particular  a right  cannot be identi-
fied with  the possession of  factual  advantages or  with  the  ability
to bring a successful  legal action.57  What is expressed by the word
" right "  can only be described as a power .Since  this  power  does
to be considered as " a fictitious
'"'
...Cf.  Dworkin,  ..Is  ~w  a  System  of  Rules?"  in
55  lbid.  86.
Ross  says:  (they  are)  directives
,.~r~.~,,\,  ',-:iit:-c;! i",,;
";Gt',~X  :,,1';
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power, an ideal or imaginary  power."  31 The belief in the existence
of  such fictitious  and imaginary  powers is ultimately  derived from
a  belief  in  magic.59  Although  it  is  not  possible  to  say anything
about  the  nature  of  the  fictitious  power  which  people  believe  is
denoted by  the word  " right  "  it  is possible to describe in terms of
fact  tile uses to which  the word  can be put.  There is first  of all  the
use of  the word  " right  "  in  legislation  or judgments.  Here it  func-
tions as an imperative  expression.  If  a law or a judgment  declares
that a person has a right,  both that person and others are influenced
to behave in a particular  way .10 Second, the word  " right  "  may be
used to arouse feelings of  conviction  or strength in connection with
certain  courses of action..1  Third,  the word  is a useful shorthand.
The judge, instead of reciting all the facts and the rules which in his
opinion  allow  tile  plaintiff  to succeed in  an action,  may simply  say
that  the  plaintiff  has a  right.  There  are  numerous  occasions in
which  it  is convenient  to  talk  of  a right  of  ownership  rather  than
to set out all the relevant facts and rules..2
In  his later  writings  Olivecrona  places greater emphasis on the
functions  of  the  word  " right."  Although  the  belief  that  right
denotes a fictitious  or imaginary power retreats to the background of
his analysis it does not disappear altogether ..3 It  is not clear whether
the notion  of  a right  as an imaginary  power  is to  be attributed  to
an  objectification  of  feelings .4 or  to  primitive  magical  beliefs.. 5
In  a  sense the  linguistic  standpoint  which  Olivecrona  adopts
especially  in  his  essay " Legal  Language  and  Reality  "  is  incom-
patible  with  his earlier  treatment  of  right  as an imaginary  power .
If,  as he remarks, there is no need for  a noun to denote an object,
and if  its function  is to express or  arouse emotions or  to  influence
~8 Ibid.  90.
~9 Ibid.  112 et  seq.,  where  HagerstrOm's  researches into  Roman  law  are cited  in  support.
80 Ibid.  94 et seq., 103 et seq.
81 Ibid.  98 et seq.
82 Ibld.  110 et  seq.  This  aspect  is  best  considered  in  connection  with  Ross'  analysis.
83 Olivecrona,  ..The  Legal  Theories  of  Axel  HagerstrOm  and  Vilhelm  Lundstedt,"  in
19S9, 3 Scandinavian  Studies  in  Law  130, n.  I,  143;  ..Legal  Language  and  Reality,"
op.  cit.,  1S4.  How  minimal  a  role  Olivecrona  is  now  prepared  to  accord  the  notion
of  a  right  as a  belief  in  an  imaginary  power  can  be seen from  the  following  remarks
in  the  latter  essay,  168  et  seq. :  It  is  evident  that  we  do  not  go  about  thinking  of
mysterious  powers  and  bonds.  Moreover,  a mysterious  power  is nothing.  As  we just
stated  the  word.  right'  is  a  hollow  word  in  the  sense that  it  is not  the  expression  of
any  notion  at  all.  The  illusion  of  a power  of  a non  factual  kind  stems from  a feeling
of  power.  This  feeling  crops  up  only  on  special  occasions.  ...We  use the  words
.right'  and.  duty  ,  as  if  they  signified  some  non  factual  powers  and  bonds,  but  we
do  it  without  really  thinking  about  such things.
8'  Olivecrona,  "  The  Legal  Theories  of  Axel  HigerstrOm  and  Vilhelm  Lundstedt,"  op.
cit.,  143;  "  Legal  Language  and  Reality,"  op.  cit.,  168 et seq.
8~ Olivecrona,  ..Legal  Lan&Uaie  and Reality,"  op.  cit.,  17S et seq.51 SCANDINA  VIAN  REALISM
behaviour, the case for  saying that  it  is believed to stand for  a non-
existent entity becomes  very weak.
Most  emphasis is  laid- upon  the  effects which  the  use of  the
word  ..right  "  has on  people's behaviour  and  its  use as a  means
by which certain information  may be communicated.66  Olivecrona
classifies ..right  "  as a  ..hollow  "  word,  tl1at is, as a  word  which
does  not stand for  a real object but has certain specific functions.  Its
most important  function  is to act on people's emotions and feelings
in such a way as to  influence their  behaviour .61  If  a person states
that he has tl1e right  of ownership or simply that he is owner the use
of the word  right  (or owner) acts as a sign which  releases  a psycho-
logical reaction  on the part  of  other  people.  They  will  feel bound
not to interfere  with  the owner's enjoyment of his property.  Like-
wise if  someone is told  that he is owner or that  he has the right  of
ownership he feels that  he may  deal as he pleases with  the object
which  he  owns.  The  intensity  of  the  feelings  aroused  will  vary
from individual  to individual.  Very  often the reaction  to the word
..right  "  will  merely  be a spontaneous urge to  behave in  a certain
way.  Statements about  rights  only  have this  psychological  effect
when they are used in  appropriate  circumstances.  If  a person says
that he has the right  of ownership his statement will  only achieve tl1e
psychological effect of influencing others to abstain from  interference
if  it is supposed that he has some ground  for  the statement, that is,
has acquired the property  in one of a limited  number of ways.  The
sign function  of  statements about  rights  is thus  linked  to  another
function  which they have, namely to impart  information.
Statements about  rights  have an informative  function  because
they permit  inferences to  be  made as to  the  existence of  certain
facts.  A  statement that  a person has a right  to  be paid  a sum of
money enables the listener to  infer  t'hat some previous  transaction
has taken place (a loan, sale, etc.) or  that  some other  circumstance
has occurred (a bequest in a will)  of  the sort to justify  a statement
that the speaker has a right.  He  cannot  infer  what  precise trang..
action  has  taken  place  but,  unless  he  has  some  reason  to  be
suspicious,  he can infer  that some fact  has occurred  which  justifies
an assertion about  a right.  Statements may  have an  informative
6.  The  word"  right  "  is also  said  to  have  a technical  function  as a  shorthand  by  which
the  relation  between  facts  and  legal  consequences  may  be  expressed.  There  is  no
change from  the view  stated in  Law  aY Fact.
81 OJivecrona sometimes calls this the behaviouristic  function  of  right,  00  The Legal Theories
of  Axel  H8gerstrom  and Vilhelm  Lundstedt,"  op.  cit.,  144.52 SCANDINA  VIAN  REALISM
function  of  this sort even if  in the circumstances in which  they are
uttered  they  do  not  have a sign function.68
Ross'  treatment  of  rights  has undergone  a number  of  phases.
The analysis presented in  Towards  a Realistic  Jurisprudence relies
heavily  on the premises worked  out by H3.gerstrom; that  presented
in On Lawand  Justice and in his article  " Tu-Tu  "69 is based upon
the multiple  functions  of  language.  In  Towards  a Realistic  Juris-
prudence  Ross  treats  the  word  " right "  as an  expression for  an
invisible  and mystical  power.  Such a power is the product  of the
rationalisation  of  the feeling  of  power. 70  He attempts to  link  this
explanation  with  the  explanation  which  attributes  the  belief  in
invisible  and mystical  powers to  primitive  magical thought  by con-
structing  the  following  hypothesis.  He  accepts that  modern  man
does not  believe in the existence of  invisible  powers which  animate
the  phenomena around  him  and  which  can be  controlled  by  the
performance  of  certain  acts (magical powers).  But  he does think
that there is a link  between the psychological process which accounts
for  the  notion  of  right  in  the  modern  age  and  primitjve  man's
conception of a right  as a magical power.  The link  is the fact that
primitive  man rationalised  certain  feelings aroused by  the contem-
plation  of  the  world  around  him  into  rights  conceived as magical
powers and  gave them a form  which  lasted into  the modern  age.
Modern  man  who rationalises  from  a different  point  of  view  does
not regard rights in the same way as primitive  man but nevertheless
retains the form  or structure  which  primitive  man had given them.
Thus  even today a right  is imagined to  be an invisible  or  mystical  00
power which looks like the magical power of primitive  man although
in fact it is different.71
Something of  this approach remains in  Ross' later writings  but
there is a very  interesting  difference.  Ross admits  that  there is a
powerful  tendency  to  think  that  the  word  " right  "  stands for  an
invisible  power.  He  attributes  this  not  to  the  rationalisation  of
feelings of  power  but  to  a natural  mistake  brought  about  by  the
structure  of  the  sentences in  which  the  word  " right  "  is  used.
Although  the function  of these sentences  is to facilitate  the presenta-
&8 See in  general  Olivecrona,  ..The  Legal  Theories  of  Axel  Hiigerstrom  and  Vilhelm
Lundstedt,"  op.  cit.,  143 et seq. ;  ..Legal  Language  and  Reality,"  op.  cit.,  182 et seq.
Cj.  Arnholm,  1962, 6 Scandina1lian  Studies  in  Law,  9;  Sundby,  1968, 13 Natural  Law
Forum,  98 et seq.
89 Published  in  1957, I  Scandinavian  Studies in  Law,  137.
70 Ross, Towards  a Realistic  Jurisprudence,  189 et seq., 200 et seq.
71 Ibid.  13 et seq., 224 et seq., 256.  Cf.  also Olivecrona,  Law  as Fact,  115.53 SCANDINA  VIAN  REALISM
tion of legal rules and of decisions drawn from  these rules the word
" right  "  looks  as though  it  stands for  a substance or  real  object.
The use of the word naturally  leads people to think  of a power since
this is the only substance that could appropriately  be denoted by the
word.  Such a control  of  language over  thought  is  related  to  the
primitive  belief  that supernatural  powers can be influenced through
tlIe utterance of the correct words.72
Ross holds that many lawyers and laymen still  make the mistake
of regarding " right  "  as a word  which  stands for  some object.73 In
reality  it  is a word  which  itself  has no  " semantic reference."  It
is  used in  sentences which  look  as though  they  are  descriptions
of  fact  and yet have a totally  different  function.  Sentences  using
the word  " right  "  can only  be understood if  they are set against a
background of  legal rules.  Their  import  is to relate certain  of  the
rules of  the legal system to  some particular  state of  affairs  and in
this  way  they  constitute  a  technique  by  which  the  law  can  con-
veniently  be  presented.
To  illustrate  this  point  Ross takes the right  of  ownership.  A
large number  of  different  occurrences give rise to  the  same range
of  legal  consequences.  If  a  person  buys  a  house certain  conse-
quences  follow;  if  he inherits  a house the same consequences  follow
and likewise if  he is given one.  Very  often the person who acquires
the house or  others concerned in  some way  with  it  are interested  ,
only  in  the  legal  consequences of  the  acquisition.  Instead  of
having to  say tlIat  the rules provide  that  if  a person buys a house
then he may  take steps to  secure undisturbed  possession,  or  that  a
person who has inherited  a house may take similar  steps, they find
it  convenient to have a single word  or phrase which allows them to
dispense with  a  recital  of  the  rule  and  the  facts  which  entail  a
particular  legal consequence.  So tlIey may simply say that a person
who has the right  of ownership or who is the owner may take steps
to eject intruders from  his property.
Sentences  which contain the word  " right  " and so act as a short-
hand by which  the relation  between rules of  law  and facts may be
expressed have a descriptive  and a prescriptive  aspect.  They  can
be said to  describe in  tlIe  sense that  they  refer  to,  or  imply  the
72 Ross,  0' Tu-Tu,"  op.  dt.,  145  et  seq. ;  On  Law  and  Justice,  178  et  seq.  Cf.  also
Olivecrona's  view  outlined  above.
71 Cj.  Ross, Directives  and  Norms,  134:  This  metaphysical  way  of  considering  duties  and
rights  to  be  substantial  entities  largely  prevails  in  Continental  and  Anglo-American
legal  thinking,  and  has  had  unfortunate  results  for  the  treatment  of  practical  legal
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existence of, one of  the states of affairs to which  the law attaches a
particular  set of  consequences.  They  can be said to  prescribe in
the  sense that  they  imply  that  tile  person  to  whom  the  right  is
attributed  can  effectively  make  use  of  a  range  of  legal  conse-
quences.74 The statement that a person has the right  of ownership
or  is  owner  on  the  one hand  implies  the  existence of  a  state of
affairs such as a  purchase or a gift  or a legacy (descriptive function)
and on the other implies that rules of law permit him to take various
courses of  action,  such as to  deal with  the  property  as he thinks
fit or to prosecute trespassers.75
The  essence of  Ross'  explanation  of  sentences containing  the
word  " right  "  is that  (I)  they have to be understood in the light  of
a  legal  system, and  (2)  they  permit  the  implication  botil  of  the
existence of a certain state of affairs and of the attachment of certain
legal consequences  to that state of affairs.
For  both  Olivecrona  and  Ross  the  elucidation  of  statements
about  rights  depends upon an appreciation  of the uses of language.
For  Olivecrona  the  main  significance  of  statements about  rights
lies in  tile  influence which  they have on people's behaviour.  Here
the psychological  effect of  language preponderates.  On  the other
hand  for  Ross such statements function  primarily  as a means by
which  complicated  situations involving  a relationship  between facts
and  rules  of  law  can be expressed.  Olivecrona's  account  is open
to the same objection as that which can be brought  against explana-
tions  of  validity  in  terms of  the psychological  reaction  aroused by
directives.  Statements about rights may have certain psychological
effects  on  tile  persons  to  whom  they  are  addressed.  But  their
meaning cannot be elucidated through  a description  of  such effects.
More  relevant are the informative  and the technical functions  which
Olivecrona  treats  as subsidiary  to  the  sign function.
There  is little  to  which  one may  object  in  Ross' account in  so
far  as it  holds  that  statements about  rights  can be elucidated  by
setting  out  the  rules  and  the  facts  to  which  an implicit  reference
'4 Ross' prescriptive  function is to be distinguished  from Olivecrona's sign function.  Ross
does not hold that the primary function of  statements  about rights is to get someone
to behave  in a particular way.  His language  is not always without ambiguity.  Thus
he says  that the statement ..shut  the door"  is an expression  of a prescription if  it  is
presented  as a guide for  behaviour, ..Tu-Tu,"  op. cit., 140.  He certainly accepts  that
statements  about rights  may  influence behaviour.  Cf.  above on  Ross' analysis of
descriptive  language.
'5 Ross, On Law and Justice, Chapter 6, esp. 172 et .\,eq.  ;  " Tu-Tu,"  op. cit., 139.  Cf.
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is  made.  Statements about  legal  rights  presuppose the  existence
of a legal system and refer  to certain  rules of  that  system.76
What  does perhaps astonish is that  Ross, and also Olivecrona,
still  revert  in  their  explanations  to  the  belief  that  right  stands for
a non-existent  power  which  is conceived as a  real  entity.  There
does not  appear to be any evidence for  such a belief.  People may
assert that  they  have a right  and  therefore  that  they  have certain
powers.  If  asked  to  explain  what  they  meant  they  would  reply
that  the  law  permits  them  to  do  certain  things.  They  might  not
understand which  precise rules  were  involved  but  the  essence of
their  explanation  would  be  that  the  rules  of  law  permitted  them
to behave in  a certain  way, and that  they expressed this by saying
that  they  had  a  right  or  a  power .
GEOFFREY  MACCORMACK.
71 See  on  this  Hart,  "  Definition  and  Theory  in  Jurisprudence,"  1954,  70  L.Q.R.  37.
For  a criticism  of  the  approach  taken  by  Ross and  Hart,  see Simpson,  1964, 80 L.Q.R.
535.